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SMORGASBORD OF REMEDIES
WALTER A. BATES*
The title for my remarks is derived from a comment of the trial judge
in a case I tried in common pleas court a few years ago. The judge,
who incidentally is now on the Ohio supreme court, had just read the
special charges before argument and then called a short recess. As the
jury was filing out, the judge came down to the trial table to chat with
counsel. He is a very able and experienced defense counsel who had prob-
ably heard, if not delivered, most standard final arguments. After the
usual chit-chat about 'how much time do you need for summation,' he
smilingly remarked, "And after recess, I expect we will all be treated to
a smorgasbord of oratory." Herein I will attempt to serve up a smorgas-
bord of remedies.
You may recall-in the good old days-that we only had to deal with
relatively simple concepts, such as conscious parallelism, cross-elasticity of
demand, and qualitative and quantitative substantiality. We've got a whole
new set of buzz words in remedies these days, such as fluid class recovery,
escheat, parens patriae and cy pres. You will note that the jargon of
antitrust is going international. The material I would like to examine
includes current and emerging remedies in antitrust suits, particularly class
actions, and perhaps some limitations-practical, beneficial or otherwise-
on these remedies.
The statutes we're concerned with are, of course, § 41 and 162 of the
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Association's Sixth Annual Antitrust Institute in November 1972.
1 Suits by Persons Injured; amount of recovery.
Any person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of anything
forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor in any district court of the United
States in the district in which the defendant resides or is found or has an agent, without
respect to the amount in controversy, and shall recover threefold the damages by him
sustained, and the cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee.
15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970).
Judgment in favor of Government as evidence; suspension of limitations.
A final judgement or decree . . . in any civil or criminal proceeding brought by,
or on behalf of the United States under the antitrust laws to the effect that defendant
has violated such laws shall be prima facie evidence against such defendant in any
action or proceeding brought by any other party against such defendant under said laws
or by the United States under section 15a of this title, as to all matters respecting
which said judgment or decree would be an estoppel as between the parties thereto:
Provided, That this section shall not apply to consent judgments or decrees entered
before any testimony has been taken or to judgments or decrees entered in actions under
section 15a of this title.
15 U.S.C. § 16(a) (1970).
Injunctive Relief for Private Parties, exceptions.
Any person, firm, corporation, or association shall be entitled to sue for and have
injunctive relief. . . against threatened loss or damage by a violation of the antitrust
laws, including sections thirteen, fourteen, eighteen and nineteen of this Title, when
and under the same conditions and principles as injunctive relief against threatened
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Clayton Act. Section 4 simply provides that any person injured in his
business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws
shall recover threefold damages and the cost of suit, including a reasonable
attorney's fee. There are a number of cases discussing and interpreting
that last item-a reasonable attorney's fee-but I haven't yet been able
to determine whether these courts awarded a reasonable fee for counsel
or a fee for a reasonable attorney. If large fees make your mouth water,
you might review the Perkins3 case in which counsel fees approached
$300,000, and the TWA-Hughes4 case in which plaintiff's counsel were
awarded $7.5 million, an average hourly rate of $128.' That's what
I like to think of as a reasonable attorney's fee, especially in light of the
fact that it was just for taking a default judgment. We will also look
at the remedy of injunctive relief through private actions as authorized
by § 16 of the Clayton Act.
The initial point in a discussion of remedies in private suits is the
language of the Supreme Court in Minnesota Mining and Mfg. v. New
Jersey Wood Finishing Co.:6 "Congress has expressed its belief that private
antitrust litigation is one of the surest weapons for effective enforcement
of the antitrust laws."'7 That this weapon is not being neglected is illus-
trated by statistics showing that the number of private suits filed under
§ 4-excluding the electrical equipment industry cases-has almost trebled.
One might well ask whether this threefold increase in ten years reflects
an increased awareness of relief through private antitrust litigation or sim-
ply an increase in crime, that is, the number of violations.
Turning to the remedy of damages, what are the current legal doctrines
of damages in class action suits? Perhaps the master key cases will serve
to illustrate.
In 1969, the government brought four separate Schwinn-8type cases
against four manufacturers of locks and hardware, charging that vertical
restrictions had been imposed by each manufacturer on its own distributors
with respect to territories and customers. Three manufacturers (wisely
perhaps) negotiated consent orders agreeing not to impose any restrictions
on a distributor as to where or to whom it could resell master key systems,
conduct that will cause loss of damage is granted by courts of equity, under the rules
governing such proceedings....
15 U.S.C. § 26 (1970).
3 Perkins v. Standard Oil Co., 399 U.S. 22 (1970).
4Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hughes, 449 F.2d 51 (2d Cit. 1971), revd, 41 U.S.L.W.
4131 (U.S. Jan. 10, 1973).
q 449 F.2d at 79.
6 381 U.S. 311 (1965).
7 Id. at 318.
8 United States v. Eaton, Yale, & Towne, Inc., 1972 Trade Cas. 5 73,889, 74012 (D.
Conn.); United States v. Sargent Corp., 1970 Trade Cas. 5 73,104 (D. Conn.); United States
v. Emhart Corp., 1970 Trade Cas. 5 73,048 (D. Conn.); United States v. Ilco Corp., 1969
Trade Cas. 5 72,904 (D. Conn.).
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an operation whereby a so-called "change" key will open one door-your
office or motel room, for example-and a master key will open all the
doors on one floor-for the maid-and a grand master key will permit
entrance to all the doors in the building, for a security guard or janitor.
After some negotiations concerning a consent order, it was decided
to try the government case. Judge Blumenfeld, Chief Judge of the District
of Connecticut, found no territorial restrictions, but he did find customer
restrictions in four specific instances and entered an injunction against such
practices.
After the consent orders of the other manufacturers, but before the
trial in our case, treble damage class actions were filed, and presently all
four manufacturers are joined as co-defendants in a dozen suits by seven
states, two cities (one of which, of course, is Philadelphia) two Boards of
Education, and two builder-owners of apartments, motels, hotels and office
buildings. All but one of the suits were filed under Federal Civil Rule
23, and the classes sought include all states, counties, cities and other politi-
cal subdivisions and all builder-owners, developers and contractors of apart-
ment houses, motels, hotels, and office buildings. The cases have all been
consolidated before Judge Blumenfeld. Turning once again to my smor-
gasbord of remedies, which ones have the plaintiffs sought? In what can
only be described as a pedestrian approach, plaintiffs pray for threefold
damages (as yet unspecified), costs and a reasonable attorney's fee. Ac-
tually the cases have not proceeded to the point at which any dollar figure
can even be suggested.
You are all aware, I am sure, that antitrust class cases of this kind
involve some rather spectacular amounts-$400,000,000 in the electrical
equipment cases,9 $100,000,000 so far in the settlements in the antibiotic
cases,10 and, in the plumbing fixtures cases, plaintiffs are seeking
$50,000,000. 1 These figures remind me of another judge's comment.
Judge Decker, before whom I tried a Robinson-Patman Act case in Chicago,
inquired whether the case couldn't be settled because plaintiff had only
sued for $25,000. "Usually when I see these cases," said Judge Decker,
"there is a string of zeros running all the way across the page."
Fortunately perhaps for the master key systems manufacturers, the states
are alleging damages for their own purchases of master key systems rather
than under the parens patriae theory raised-and rejected-in Hawaii.2
There the Supreme Court ruled that a state could not sue on behalf of
9 Philadelphia Elec. Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 1964 Trade Cas. 5 71,123 (E.D.
Pa. 1964).
1OWest Virginia v. Chas. Pfizer Co., 314 F. Supp. 710 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), affd, 440 F.2d
1079 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 871 (1971).
"lPhiladelphia Housing Auth. v. American Radiator and Standard Sanitary Corp., 322
F. Supp. 834 (E.D. Pa. 1971), apd sub vora., Ace Heating and Plumbing Co. v. Crane Co., 453
F.2d 30 (3d Cir. 1971).
12 Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251 (1972).
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all its citizens for alleged antitrust damages. Obviously the state can sue
as a "person injured" under § 4, and as a representative of a class of
persons injured, but not as parens patriae.
In Hawaii the state had sought to recover either damages for antitrust
violations based on the alleged injury to the economy of the state over
and above the injury to individual consumers or, alternatively, aggregate
damages based upon the alleged injury to the individual consumers within
the state. The court denied recovery on either theory, but noted that a
class action under Rule 23 would be the appropriate means for redressing
the injury to consumers within the state.
Consumer classes have not been treated very kindly by some courts.
In the bread cases pending in the Northern District of Ohio, Judge Green
allowed classes of state subdivisions and school authorities but denied a
class of consumers. And in Hackett v. General Host,"3 the so-called "death
knell" case, plaintiff was allowed to pursue her remedy of $9.00 in dam-
ages against the price-fixing bakeries, but she was not permitted class action
treatment. The result is obviously an unrequited remedy.
Return for a moment to the master key cases in which the states are
asserting claims for all governmental entities who directly or indirectly
purchased defendants' master key systems. You should know that master
key systems are sold to distributors who sell to contractors who install
them in the doors of the motels, hospitals, schools and other buildings.
You also should know that the government's case on which the private .
suits are based did not allege horizontal price-fixing or resale price-fixing.
The question I raise here is whether the classes of governmental institutions
who are really in effect "consumers" don't run into the defense of lack
of privity between plaintiffs and defendants as was successfully raised in
Denver v. American Oil Company.14 You will recall that the passing-
on defense (except for "cost-plus" situations) was denounced in Hanover
Shoe," in which the Supreme Court held that, to have a prima facie case
of injury, a buyer must show only that he has been charged an illegally
excessive price and that he can identify the amount of the overcharge.
If both of these are satisfied, a buyer can maintain a suit for treble dam-
ages.
Later, however, the district court in Philadelphia Housing Authority
v. American Radiator1 held that in order to prevent multiple liability,
the presumption created by Hanover against passing on by an immediate
purchaser required a similar presumption that an ultimate consumer has
not sustained the injury necessary to bring suit under § 4. Hence the
13 1972 Trade Cas. 5 73,800 (3d Cir.).
14 53 F.R.D. 620 (D. Colo 1971).
15 392 U.S. 481 (1968).
16 50 F.R.D. 13 (E.D. Pa. 1970), aff'd, 438 F.2d 1187 (3d Cir. 1971).
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court ruled that individual homeowners lacked standing to sue the manufac-
turers of the plumbing fixtures installed in their homes.
In the Denver case, the court ruled that the abolition of the passing-
on defense created a requirement that privity exist between the plaintiff
and the alleged antitrust violator before an action for treble damages could
be maintained. 17 The decision has been criticized as too restrictive and
as destructive of the purposes for which § 4 was enacted. While it may
be acceptable in a price-fixing situation in which the purchaser buys directly
from the price-fixer, its applicability is hard to accept in the case in which
the purchaser-the one in privity with the seller-is a distributor who
is alleged to be a co-conspirator in the restriction of territories and cus-
tomers. My conclusion here is that while Denver may be helpful in the
master key cases, it does not mean that complete salvation is at hand.
Within the remedies framework, I have two further subjects to touch
upon-damage distribution and private relief in § 7 cases.
The amendment to rule 23 in 196618 adopted the "opt out" theory,
that is, that everyone is a member of the class purported to be represented
unless he acts to exclude himself from the suit. I would like to discuss
the problems that arise once the class has been determined, the recovery
set, and there are class members who remain silent, not attempting to
collect their respective shares of the recovery.
Suppose, for example, that the class allowed consists of builder-con-
tractors who bought and installed master key systems. The case proceeds
to settlement or judgment whereby a fund is created for the satisfaction
of claims. Because of the "opt out" rule, the fund is supposed to cover
all potential claimants rather than just those who made some affirmative
indication of: (1) a claim; and (2) an amount. However, at this point
courts and counsel face the problem of proper distribution of uncollected
or unclaimed damages.
Various solutions have been offered-all based expressly on the reason-
ing that defendants (the wrongdoers) should not receive the uncollected
damages as a windfall. The cy pres doctrine associated with law school
courses on trusts and estates suggests the availability of three approaches
for the disposition of such unclaimed damages: The first is disposition to
those class members who appeared in order to claim their damages. How-
ever, this method has certain deficiencies which make it generally unaccep-
table, such as failure to compensate, even indirectly, silent class members,
and possible encouragement of class actions which are likely to result in
large, uncollected damage funds. The second approach is distribution
through the state as parens patriae or by escheat. Here it seems clear that
the Supreme Court's reasons for its restrictive interpretation of parens
17 53 F.R.D. at 636-37.
18 FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2).
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patriae damage suits in Hawaii would not defeat the state's claim to the
uncollected damage pool recovered in a proper class action. The third
approach to these uncollected damages is distribution through the market.
The availability of this last approach is questionable, however, after the
recent Second Circuit holding in Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin,9 a suit by
several million investors against the two major odd-lot dealers on the New
York Stock Exchange for conspiracy to monopolize odd-lot trading and to
charge excessive fees in violation of the Sherman Act.
The district court held the suit not maintainable as a class action due
to insuperable difficulties in its management.2 0 The Second Circuit was
not of the same opinion as the district court though, and determined that
the manageability problems did not appear to be insoluble.2 On remand,
the district court found that while individual damages were impossible to
calculate, total or gross damages could be fairly established from the records
of defendants and the stock exchange and it gave preliminary approval
to the plaintiff's proposal for a "fluid class recovery ' 22 and determined thatdefendants should be assessed 90o of the costs of discovery because of
the probability that plaintiffs would prevail.2 3
Under this concept there would be a preliminary opportunity after grossdamages were determined for each class member to prove his individual
damage. Thereafter, a pool of the remainder of uncollected damages couldbe set up and the odd-lot differential in all transactions involving the defen-dants would be reduced in an amount determined by the court until this
uncollected damage fund was depleted. Unfortunately for the plaintiffs
in Eisen, the Second Circuit again heard the case and held the principal of
a "fluid class recovery" to be "illegal, inadmissible as a solution of the
manageability problems of the class actions, and wholly improper. '2 4
One final area of remedies merits attention. I have been discussing
remedies for violations of § 1 of the Sherman Act, such as price-fixing
and conspiracies to allocate customers and markets. What about § 7 of
the Clayton Act, the anti-merger statute, which prohibits acquisitions of
stock or assets if the effect may be to substantially lessen competition or
to tend to create a monopoly? The field has not been overlooked, but
thus far plaintiffs have been almost uniformly unsuccessful. In the Gottes-
19 CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 3 93,963 (May 1, 1973) reh'g. denied, CCH FED. SEc. L. REP.5 93,999 (2d Cir. May 24, 1973).
20 41 F.R.D. 147 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
21 391 F.2d 555 (2d Cit. 1968).
2252 F.R.D. (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
23 54 F.R.D. 565 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).2 4 CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 5 93,963 at p. 93,862 (2d Cir. May 1, 1973).
In denying a rehearing en bane the Second Circuit noted that the issue involved amatter of such import that a final determination by the Supreme Court was inevitable,
and further consideration by the Second Circuit would merely delay the process.CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 93,999 at p. 94,009 (2d Cir. May 24, 1973).
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man25 case in the district court, in Highland Supply,26 Bailey's Bakery27
and Dairy Foods,2" private litigants were denied remedies by way of money
damages under §, 7. In Highland Supply, the court based its ruling on
plaintiff's lack of standing to attack an alleged violation of § 7.
The Second Circuit, considering Gottesman on appeal, agreed that a
violation of § 7 does not furnish a basis for a claim of money damages
under the broad language of § 4 of the Clayton Act, but the court did
allow the plaintiff to show actual damages once a § 7 violation had been
established.29 Similarly, the Fifth Circuit in Dailey" has rejected the idea
that private plaintiffs should be prohibited from recovering treble damages
for § 7 violations. However, I am not aware of any case in which a
private litigant has actually collected anything under this concept.
I should note, however, the case of Purex v. Procter & Gamble"' where-
in Purex has sued for more than 500 million dollars arising out of the de-
fendant's unlawful acquisition of Clorox. The District Court for the Cen-
tral District of California ruled admissible the Federal Trade Commission
determination that the merger violated § 7, which determination was later
approved by the Supreme Court. The precise procedural point in issue was
that the district court denied defendant's motion that the Commission's
order was not entitled to prima facie effect and denied plaintiff's motion
that the order should have the effect of collateral estoppel. However,
the point here is that Purex is going forward with its suit for treble damages
because of the illegal acquisition of Clorox by Procter and Gamble.
A subject related to treble damages for violation of § 7 is whether
the private litigant can have the remedy of divestiture under the same
statute. There seems to be no question that the unwilling bride in a corpo-
rate marriage can seek to enjoin her would-be suitor under § 16. A com-
pany that is being acquired against its will, such as by tender offer, is
clearly the direct target and thus has standing to sue for divestiture, claim-
ing that the acquisition violates § 7. If the preliminary injunction is de-
nied, however, the bridegroom usually effects his takeover and instructs his
wife's lawyer to stop the suit.
Some courts have exhibited an unwillingness to superintend a divesti-
ture effort at the behest of a private party, although they do not seem
to exhibit a similar reluctance in response to the government's request.
2 5 Gottesman v. General Motors Corp., 221 F. Supp. 488 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
2 Highland Supply Corp. v. Reynolds Metals Co., 327 F.2d 725 (8th Cit. 1964).2 7 Bailey's Bakery, Ltd. v. Continental Baking Co., 235 F. Supp. 705 (D. Hawaii 1964),
aff'd mem., 401 F.2d 182 (9th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1086 (1969), reh'g denied,
394 U.S. 967 (1969).2 8 Dairy Foods Inc. v. Farmer's Co-operative Creamery, 298 F. Supp. 774 (D. Minn. 1969).
29414 F.2d 956 (2d Cit. 1969).
30 380 F.2d 484, 488 (5th Cir. 1967).
3' 308 F. Supp. 584 (C.D. Calif. 1970) (presently being appealed).
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One reason may be that presumably the policy planning section of the
Antitrust Division has some economic "game plan," whereas the individual
litigant cannot. Whatever the reason, the number of private divestiture
suits is minimal, and certainly none has been brought as a class action.
Also of note is what might be described as the "double whammy"
case in which a violation of § 7 was raised by both sides, as both a remedy
and a defense 2 In 1957, General Foods acquired SOS, the soap pad peo-
ple. In 1963 all the assets of Brillo Corporation, the majbr competitor
of SOS in soap pads, were acquired by Purex. In 1968, pursuant to an
FTC finding of a violation of § 7, General Foods was ordered to divest
itself of its SOS holdings. In 1969 Purex, the owner of Brillo, sued General
Foods, former owner of SOS, for damages arising out of a violation of
§ 7 in acquiring SOS in 1957.
General Foods in turn attempted to put the double whammy on Purex
by claiming that even if the acquisition of SOS violated § 7, so did Purex's
acquisition of Brillo; and not only did it violate § 7, but §§ 1 and 2
of the Sherman Act as well. The effort failed, however, and the affirmative
defenses were ordered stricken.
Let me leave one thought with you. In March of 1972 there appeared
in the Antitrust and Trade Regulation Reporter an analysis posing the
question: "Ebbtide for Class Actions ?"a The editor's conclusion, labelled
tentative, which it certainly was, stated:
It is too early to say whether there is a bacdlash in the lower courts
against class actions, but the cases cited above going against plaintiffs and
the earlier decisions in Denver and City of Philadelphia vs American Oil
Company may indicate the beginning of a trend toward a less favorable
view of class actions.34
There are already indications that the federal courts are reconsidering
whether there isn't someplace in the scheme of things for an application
of the doctrine of de minimus non curat lex.
Undoubtedly, the major cases for per se violations of § 1 will and
should persist. But other actions, for example consumer actions for delayed
technology, air pollution and other environmental insults-especially when
forced into an antitrust framework-will, I believe, meet with increased
resistence from the courts.
All this may be summed up by saying that my smorgasbord may well
be less sumptuous in the future than it has been in the past.
3 2 Purex v. General Foods Corp., 318 F. Supp. 322 (C.D. Calif. 1970).
3 3 ANTIRUST AND TRADE REG. REP. (BNA March 14, 1972).
341d. at B-4 (citations omitted).
